

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03825 231950Z

65

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OES-05 FEAE-00 NRC-07 CIAE-00 EUR-12

H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02

PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15

TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 AF-06 ARA-10 EA-10

NEA-10 /141 W

----- 041761

P R 231750Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3177

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

RUEHBAC AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 970

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION NATO

ERDA GERMANTOWN MD

UNCLAS GENEVA 3825

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: COMMITTEE I

1. US DEL (KLEIN) DELIVERED FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO  
COMMITTEE I ON 23 MAY:

QUOTE: MR. CHAIRMAN

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 03825 231950Z

I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS CONTAINED IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS NPT/CONF/17 AND 18. BOTH OF THESE DRAFT PROTOCOLS LINK PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING WIDER ADHERENCE TO THE NPT WITH FURTHER STEPS TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED IN ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT. THUS, THEY APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED BY THE CO-SPONSORS TO DEMONSTRATE AN INTEGRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFORTS TO CURB WHAT IS OFTEN INFORMALLY CALLED "VERTICLE" PROLIFERATION ON THE ONE HAND AND "HORIZONTAL" PROLIFERATION ON THE OTHER.

MY DELEGATION RECOGNIZES THE RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN ARTICLE VI AND EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS I STATED IN MY INTERVENTION LAST WEEK, WE ARE AWARE THAT THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION DEPENDS TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI, AS WELL AS ON SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS; HOWEVER, IN MY DELEGATION'S VIEW, THE TWO DRAFT PROTOCOLS UNDER CONSIDERATION DO NOT REALLY PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY WAY OF PROMOTING FURTHER PROGRESS ON ARTICLE VI.

LET ME FIRST TURN TO THE DRAFT PROTOCOL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING CONTAINED IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENT 17

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AGREEMENT. BUT IN OUR JUDGMENT IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC TO ASSUME -- AND I BELIEVE THOSE WHO HAVE STUDIED THE PROBLEM SERIOUSLY WOULD AGREE -- THAT WE COULD ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE SO FAR INHIBITED PROGRESS.

AN IMPORTANT OBSTACLE HAS BEEN THE DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST ON THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. THE UNITED STATES HAS INVESTED A LOT OF TIME AND EFFORT IN IMPROVING SEISMIC MONITORING CAPABILITIES. IN THE PAST DECADE WE HAVE SPENT LARGE SUMS TO SET UP SEISMIC COLLECTION AND DATA DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS TO INVESTIGATE AND ENLARGE THE POSSIBILITIES OF TELESEISMIC MONITORING OF SEISMIC EVENTS. IMPRESSIVE GAINS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THIS FIELD. BUT, IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03825 231950Z

OUR VIEW, SEISMIC METHODS WOULD STILL BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE THAT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS WERE NOT BEING CONDUCTED CLANDESTINELY IN VIOLATION OF A CTB. WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

ANOTHER ISSUE THAT MUST BE DEALT WITH SERIOUSLY IS THE

TREATMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AGREEMENT. IF SUCH EXPLOSIONS WERE TO BE PERMITTED UNDER A CTB, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE NOT USED TO GAIN WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE PROCEDURES CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUCH ASSURANCE. TO DATE, THE PROBLEMS OF ACCOMMODATING PNES UNDER A CTB HAVE HARDLY BEEN ADDRESSED INTERNATIONALLY.

THE DRAFT PROTOCOL CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT 17 TIES THE SUSPENSION OF ALL UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS NOT TO THE RESOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS, BUT RATHER TO THE NUMBER OF STATES ADHERING TO THE NPT. THIS STRIKES US AS RATHER ARBITRARY. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ADHERENCE BY THE 100TH NPT PARTY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF TEST BAN VERIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THESE OBSTACLES BE OVERCOME BEFORE THE 100TH ADHERENCE TO THE NPT, SHOULD WE NECESSARILY WAIT ANY LONGER TO STOP TESTING?

MY GOVERNMENT ALSO CANNOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM. WE HAVE HELD ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THAT A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING WOULD INHERENTLY LACK THE SAFEGUARDS OF A FORMAL INTERNATIONAL TREATY, WOULD BE POLITICALLY LESS STABLE THAN A TREATY, AND WOULD BE MUCH LESS LIKELY THAN A TREATY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN BRIEFLY TO THE DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT 18. AS I STATED LAST WEEK, THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED AND FULLY COMMITTED TO MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN FULLY UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 GENEVA 03825 231950Z

FULFILLMENT OF OUR ARTICLE VI OBLIGATION. SPECIFICALLY, WE LOOK FORWARD, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT, TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ACHIEVING FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE DRAFT PROTOCOL BEFORE US ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS AT SALT. IT WOULD SUBSTITUTE A SIMPLE MATHEMATICAL FORMULA FOR THE SERIOUS AND COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED. I BELIEVE PARTICIPANTS AT THIS CONFERENCE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND WHY MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCEPT THIS ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.

I WOULD ONLY ASK MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER WHETHER ANY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, WHETHER THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS VITAL TO

ITS NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD PERMIT OTHER GOVERNMENTS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTABLISH THE CRITICAL PARAMETERS TO GUIDE THEIR EFFORTS - - BOTH IN TERMS OF PACE AND CONTENT. I DO NOT THINK THEY WOULD. AND THE UNITED STATES CERTAINLY DOES NOT THINK THIS IS A VERY PRODUCTIVE APPROACH.

THE RATE OF PROGRESS AT SALT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES ON THE BASIS OF THEIR SUCCESS IN RESOLVING THE COMPLICATED ISSUES INVOLVED. ARBITRARY DEADLINES AND CONDITIONS, SUCH AS THOSE SUGGESTED IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENT 18, CANNOT BE IMPOSED. A SIMPLE QUANTITATIVE ADDITION OF PARTIES TO THE NPT CLEARLY BEARS NO SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP TO THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR SALT REDUCTIONS.

MOREOVER, ESTABLISHING THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AND MIRV'D MISSILES CANNOT BE A SIMPLE EXERCISE IN LINEAR ARITHMETIC, AS CONFERENCE DOCUMENT 18 SEEMS TO ASSUME. THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC FORCES RESULTING FROM EACH POSSIBLE COMBINATION OF REDUCTIONS IN THESE LEVELS MUST BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO OR DETRACT FROM STRATEGIC STABILITY. TO ASSUME, AS THE DRAFT PROTOCOL APPARENTLY DOES, THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK NUMBERS CAN ARBITRARILY BE REDUCED BY IDENTICAL PERCENTAGES, PICKED ESSENTIALLY AT RANDOM

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 05 GENEVA 03825 231950Z

WITHOUT THIS KIND OF CAREFUL ANALYSIS, SEEMS TO US TO OVERSIMPLIFY A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM AND TO TREAT SUPERFICIALLY THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS KINDS OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE CANNOT GO ALONG WITH A SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH OUTLINE IN THE TWO DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS. NOR, FRANKLY, CAN WE AGREE TO THE FORMAT. WHILE IN PRINCIPLE WE ARE FLEXIBLE ON THE MATTER OF FORM, WE FULLY SHARE THE VIEW OF THOSE OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE WHICH HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THE ADOPTION OF THESE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY, OF AMENDING THE TREATY AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE APPROPRIATE. MOREOVER, SINCE THEY WOULD ONLY BE OPEN FOR ADHERENCE BY STATES THAT SEEM TO OPPOSE THEM, THEIR COMMENDATION BY THIS CONFERENCE IN EFFECT WOULD BE AN UNREALISTIC AND EVEN EMPTY GESTURE.

MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT ANY RECOMMENDATION BY THIS CONFERENCE THAT CAN ACHIEVE A MEANINGFUL CONSENSUS ON ARTICLE VI CAN BE FULLY ACCOMMODATED IN THE APPROPRIATE SECTION OF THE FINAL CONFERENCE DECLARATION.

WE THEREFORE WOULD HOPE THAT THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE TWO  
DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS WOULD JOIN IN THE EFFORT TO  
FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL  
PARTIES AT THIS CONFERENCE. UNQUOTE. DALE

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